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Ad hoc presupposition construction 
 
Philosophers and linguists have long debated the phenomenon of ‘presupposition’, whereby 
speakers linguistically mark information as background or taken for granted. This debate has 
surprisingly left untouched the following two assumptions: (i) presuppositions are not part of 
what is intentionally communicated by the speaker, and (ii) the propositional content of a 
presupposition is semantically determined. These assumptions are well-established in the 
literature and they are endorsed even by scholars who offer a ‘pragmatic’ analysis of 
presuppositions. For instance, with regard to (i), Simons (2007) claims that presuppositions are 
“not part of the speaker’s communicative intention” and they are transmitted simply as a “by-
product”. Or, with regard to (ii), she suggests that the presuppositional content is “calculated, 
presumably compositionally, on the basis of the content of the trigger plus the rest of the content 
expressed” (Simons, 2005). 
In this paper, we challenge both these assumptions. We argue that presuppositions fall 
within the scope of ‘ostensive-inferential communication’ (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995) and 
illustrate the benefits of our proposal. Ostensive-inferential communication requires the 
communicator to display an overt behavior aimed at attracting attention to her communicative 
intention (‘ostension’). Furthermore, it requires the audience to infer the communicator’s 
intended meaning (‘inference’). 
First, we show that by treating presuppositions as part of what is ostensively 
communicated by the speaker, we can provide a unified account of a variety of presuppositional 
uses discussed in the literature. This account covers the whole range of cases from 
noninformative, or ‘common ground’ presuppositions, to informative presuppositions, as well 
as cases of exploitative presuppositions.  
Second, and more importantly, we suggest that by treating presuppositions as the output 
of an inferential process of pragmatic interpretation, we can shed a new light on their context-
sensitivity. Traditional accounts of presuppositions view the context-sensitivity of (at least 
some) presuppositions as pertaining to the question of whether presuppositions are contextually 
defeasible. This question does not exhaust the relation between presuppositions and context. 
The propositional content of a presupposition is determined ad hoc via a process involving both 
semantic decoding and pragmatic inference, and involving a ‘mutual parallel adjustment’ 
(Wilson & Sperber, 2004) among presuppositions, the explicit content and the implicatures of 
the utterance.  
Ostension and inference represent two sides of the same coin and can shed a 
complementary light on presupposition as a genuinely communicative phenomenon.  
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